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applicable in deciding whether the corporation has more than one
class of stock. One simply would not use the thin corporation doctrine
per se. Some of the following factors used in the thin corporation
cases could be used in determining whether the notes issued by the
Subchapter S corporation were stock: what the evidences of indebted-
ness are called; whether or not there is a maturity date; what the
origin of the payments is; whether there is a right to enforce payment
of principal or interest; whether there is a right to participate in man-
agement; whether the debt is subordinated to that of the other credi-
tors; whether there is adequate capitalization; what the "identity of
interest between the creditor and stockholder is . . ."; whether interest
is paid out of dividend money only; whether the corporation can
obtain funds from financial institutions; and what the parties' in-
tended.
21
As Gamman and Lewis suggested, these factors must be considered
on a case-by-case basis to see whether the so-called debt is actually a
debt or whether it is a capital contribution. If the latter, it will be
necessary to determine if different rights and preferences exist in
order to determine whether the evidences of the capital contribution
are a second class of stock. Use of this procedure will eliminate the
problem of definition as well as some of the confusion which has
been connected with the one class of stock requirement.
ROBERT H. POWELL, III
A STRUCK CARRIER'S RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO OPERATE
Labor relations in two of the nation's most vital industries, the rail-
roads and the airlines, are regulated by a single federal statute, the
Railway Labor Act.' In recent years there have been numerous labor
disputes involving strikes in these two industries, strikes which have
had a serious, often disruptive effect on the public and on national
interests. Due to this widespread impact, it is important to determine
exactly what measures a railway or airline may legally employ under
the Railway Labor Act to continue operations during a strike.
The Supreme Court of the United States considered this question
in a recent case, Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry.,2
which involved a much-publicized, long, and sometimes violent strike
210. H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.
1960). Although the last factor was listed separately, it seems that all the other
factors are elements of the parties' intent.
'44 Stat. 547 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1964).
2384 U.S. 238 (1966).
CASE COMMENTS
in the railroad industry. Although Railway Clerks was concerned with
a railroad labor dispute, the fact that the Railway Labor Act covers
both railroads and airlines makes the holding equally applicable to the
airline industry.3
In September 1961, several unions representing the nonoperating
employees4 of the Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) demanded a
general wage increase and a contract provision requiring advance
notice of impending layoffs and of abolition of job positions. Man-
agement and the unions went through all required procedures under
the Railway Labor Act for negotiation and mediation without reach-
ing agreement. In addition, both sides refused to submit to arbitration.
The nonoperating unions then struck, and most operating employees
honored the picket lines.
After being shut down for a short period, FEC resumed operations
with a substantially reduced labor force of supervisory personnel and
newly hired replacements for the strikers. FEC made individual agree-
ments with the members of this emergency labor force, thereby
unilaterally departing from the terms of its existing collective bar-
gaining agreements in respect to rates of pay, rules, and working con-
ditions. Later FEC replaced the individual agreements with a uniform
set of rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, also different from
the existing contracts. Claiming that these strike-induced changes could
not be lawfully instituted without following the procedures of the
Act, the unions invoked mediation but FEC refused. The unions then
sought arbitration of the original dispute, but the carrier again refused.
At this point, fifteen months after the resumption of operations by
FEC, the United States brought an action to enjoin FEC from con-
tinuing its unilateral departures from the collective bargaining agree-
ments. The nonoperating unions intervened as plaintiffs. Relying on
the decision of the Court of Appeals in Florida East Coast Ry. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainnen,5 a similar suit brought against FEC
by one of the operating unions, the District Court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction of all deviations by FEC from existing contracts until
completion of statutory mediation. However, FEC was allowed to
make application to the District Court for permission to make such
specific departures as the court deemed "reasonably necessary in
3Raiway Labor Act § 201, added by 49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181
(1964).
4"Nonoperating" employees are those who do not actually operate the trains,
such as clerks, machinists, and electricians. "Operating" employees are those
who actually operate the trains, such as engineers, firemen, and trainmen.
51336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
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order for the FEC to continue to operate during the strike."0
Upon application by FEC, the District Court entered an order au-
thorizing certain specific deviations and forbidding others.1 Both sides
appealed from the preliminary injunction and the subsequent order,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed.8 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari9 and affirmed.' The Court held that a carrier subject to the
Railway Labor Act, struck in a dispute over certain working condi-
tions as to which negotiation and mediation have been exhausted, may
make without further negotiation and mediation such unilateral
changes in other working conditions covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements as are reasonably necessary for continued operation
with a substantially different, reduced labor force of experienced
and untrained employees. The Court also approved the procedure,
first adopted in Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men,1" by which the carrier was required to make application to the
District Court before instituting any reasonably necessary unilateral
changes.
Justification for permitting FEC to make such changes was found
in a carrier's right of self-help and its duty to operate. Confinement of
the changes to those authorized by the District Court was based on
the necessity of upholding both the integrity of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and the orderly bargaining processes provided by
the Railway Labor Act.'
2
The basic dispute in Railway Clerks over wages and advance notice
of layoffs and of job abolition fell within the category of major dis-
putes, i.e., disputes which "seek to create rather than to enforce con-
tractual rights.. . ." 13 Under the Act the parties must attempt to settle
major disputes through the successive stages of notice and negotia-
6United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 57 L.R.R.M. 2618, 2622 (M.D. Fla.
1964).
7United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., No. 64-107-Civ-J, M.D. Fla., Dec. 3,
1964.
SFlorida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 348 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1965).
9Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry, 382 U.S. 1008 (1966).
1OBrotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed that the United States had standing to
bring the action. Id. at 242 n.4.
11336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
'21n a dissenting opinion Justice White expressed the view that the carrier was
free to attempt to operate but could depart from the existing contracts only as
to those matters which had been through the procedures of the Act. He found
that a strike did not constitute an implied exception to the required processes
of the Act. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238,
248 (1966).
13Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 724 (1945).
CASE COMMENTS
tion,14 mediation,15 voluntary arbitration,' 6 and possible investigation
by presidential emergency board. 17 Unless they agree to binding arbi-
tration, the parties are under no compulsion to reach agreement.' 8
However, several provisions of the Act require the parties to maintain
the status quo until the proceedings have been completed. The most
crucial is section 2 Seventh:
No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embod-
ied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agree-
ments or in section 6 of this Act.'9
Where, as in Railway Clerks, the parties to a labor dispute have ex-
hausted the procedures of the Act, they are both free to make use of
self-help measures: the union has a right to strike, and the carrier may
attempt to continue to operate if a strike occurs.20 This correlative
right of self-help was squarely upheld by the Supreme Court in an
earlier case involving the nationwide dispute of which the FEC strike
was but a part, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs v. Baltimore &
O.R.R.21 The Court observed that "both parties, having exhausted all
of the statutory procedures, are relegated to self-help in adjusting this
dispute .... ,, 22 The basis of this mutual right of self-help is the volun-
14Railway Labor Act § 6, as amended, 48 Star. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1964).
iSRailway Labor Act § 5 First, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934), 45 U.S.C.
§ 155 First (1964).
161bid.
iTRailvay Labor Act § 10, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160
(1964).
18Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945).
19 As amended, 48 Star. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh (1964). The
other status quo provisions are (1) in § 6, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 156 (1964), for the period of negotiations and ten days thereafter, and,
if the National Mediation Board enters the dispute, for so long as mediation
is conducted by the Board; (2) in § 5 First, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195 (1934),
45 U.S.C. § 155 First (1964), if the Board has given notice of failure to bring
about a settlement and has proffered arbitration, for thirty days after such
notice, unless the parties agree to arbitrate or a presidential emergency board is
created; and (3) in § 10, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964),
for the period of the emergency board's activity and for thirty days after its
report.
2 0EIgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945); Florida East Coast
Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 181 (5th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
21372 U.S. 284 (1963).
221d. at 291.
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tary nature of the statutory scheme for the settlement of major dis-
putes.2s
The right of a carrier to attempt to operate under strike conditions is
given further sanction by virtue of the duty of common carriers to
provide service to the public and to shippers. This duty has been made
statutory by the Interstate Commerce Act.24 The Railway Labor Act
itself includes among its general purposes the public interest in con-
tinuous service.2 5 Furthermore, the courts have expressly recognized
that the duty of a common carrier to provide service is not suspended
during a labor dispute.- 6
As the status quo provisions of the Railway Labor Act make clear,27
a carrier can make no unilateral changes in existing rates of pay, rules,
or working conditions until the procedures of the Act have been ex-
hausted. 28 It is equally clear that once the procedures have been ex-
hausted a carrier may make unilateral changes, even of a permanent
nature, if limited to matters which were the subject of negotiation and
mediation.2 9 What was not clear prior to Railway Clerks was the right
23Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840,
846 (2d Cir. 1962).
24Section 1(4), as amended, 54 Stat. 900 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1(4) (1964),
provides in part: "It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this
part to provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefor. .. ."
Civil liability for failure to comply with this duty is imposed on carriers by § 8
of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 382 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
25"The purposes of the Act are: (1) to avoid any interruption to commerce
or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein. . . ." Railway Labor Act S 2,
as amended, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 151a (1964).26Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 245 (1966);
accord, Farmers Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 66 F. Supp. 845, 861 (SD.
Ill. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 158 F.2d 109 (7th Cir.), vacated as 7oot
sub norn. Farmers Grain Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 332 U.S.
748 (1947); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 190 Fed. 910,
912 (E.D. IMI. 1911); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 34 Fed.
481, 484 (S.D. Iowa 1888); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac. Terminal
Co., 128 F. Supp. 475, 517 (D. Ore. 1953) (dictum). A carrier also has a duty to
provide service to a struck shipper even though the carrier's employees refuse
to cross picket lines. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co.,
215 F.2d 126, 132-35 (8th Cir. 1954); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Northern Pac.
Terminal Co., supra at 511.
27See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
28Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 346-47
(1944); Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 817 (1964); Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 864 (1959); Railroad Yardmasters
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1955); Railway Employees' Co-op.
Ass'n v. Atlanta B. & C.R.R., 22 F. Supp. 510 (D. Ga. 1938).
29Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284
(1963); Pullman Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 316 F.2d 556 (7th Cir.), cert.
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of the carrier to make temporary, strike-induced changes as to matters
not raised during the statutory bargaining in order to continue to
operate with a substantially different, reduced labor force.
The union which is the authorized bargaining representative of a
craft or a class of employees is, as held in Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R.30 and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,31 the repre-
sentative of both union and non-union employees in that craft or class.
Moreover, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency
32
held that the authorized representative must be consulted and per-
mitted to bargain about a matter even though individual employees
are willing to enter into their own agreements with the employer.
Since none of the three cases involved a strike situation, they do not
require a carrier to comply with pre-strike collective bargaining
agreements during a strike. In 1. L Case Co. v. NLRB3 3 the Court
recognized that its holding was not applicable under all conditions:
Care has been taken in the opinions of the Court to reserve a
field for the individual contract, even in industries covered by the
National Labor Relations Act, not merely as an act or evidence of
hiring, but also in the sense of a completely individually bargained
contract setting out terms of employment, because there are cir-
czmstances in which it may legally be used, in fact, in which
there is no alternative.
3 4
Although the unions remain the bargaining agents for the crafts or
classes represented before the strike, this does not mean necessarily
that carriers are prohibited from making unilateral temporary changes
in conditions during a strike.
It is useful to consider more closely the language of section 2
Seventh of the Railway Labor Act:
No carrier, its officers or agents shall change the rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class as em-
bodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such
agreements or in section 6 of this Act.3
denied. 375 U.S. 820 (1963): Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs
Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962); Flight Eng'rs Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
208 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 945 (i963); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp.
777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
30323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944).
31343 U.S. 768, 772-75 (1952).
32321 U.S. 342, 347 (1944).
33321 U.S. 332 (1944).
341d. at 336-37. (Emphasis added.)
3548 Stat. 1188 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh (1964). (Em-
phasis added.)
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In effect, a carrier may not change the provisions of the agreement
without first going through the Act's procedures. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has twice recognized 3 that a unilateral
change in conditions is not necessarily a change in agreements and,
therefore, does not necessarily fall under the similar prohibition of
section 6 of the Act.
3 7
Although only railroads and airlines are covered by the Railway
Labor Act, parallel problems as to the right of a struck business to
attempt to operate have arisen in industries under the National Labor
Relations Act,3 8 the other major federal statute dealing with labor
relations. The NLRA contains no status quo provisions similar to
those of the Railway Labor Act, but the two acts are based on a com-
mon national labor policy and create an identical scope as to the duty
to bargain.39 Furthermore, Flight Engrs Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines,
36-Switchmen's Union v. Central of Ga. Ry., 341 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 841 (1965):
[Ilt does not follow that every time a carrier takes unilateral action that may
affect "rates of pay, rules or working conditions" then section 6 must be
invoked on the theory that the carrier is thus intending to affect a "change
in agreements affecting rates of pay, rules or working conditions" which...
can be accomplished only in the manner provided under section 6 of the Act.
St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. v. Railroad Yardmasters, 328 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964):
[Rleference to the language of section 6 . . . is itself fairly clear in that it
requires the bargaining procedure only where there is an intended change in
agreements affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Obviously,
therefore, if there is no intended change in an existing contract or agreement
there is no requirement under section 6 that the bargaining procedures be
followed.
37As amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
38As amended, 61 Star. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. SS 151-68 (1964).
39Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 551-53 (1962), aff'd sub
nom. East Bay Union of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
aff'd sub nom. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
Kroner, Interim Injunctive Relief Under the Railway Labor Act, N.Y.U. 18TH
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 179, 185-86 (1966); see Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944); Terminal R.R. Ass'n v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943); H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514, 524-25 (1941); Larsen v. American Airlines, Inc., 313 F.2d 599,
602-03 (2d Cir. 1963); American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F.
Supp. 777, 793-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 31-32 n.2 (1957), which appears to be question-
able in view of the above authority and in light of the fact that the Supreme
Court cites decisions under either act interchangeably without distinguishing
them as to particular act. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 290 (1963); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union,
361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189-91 (1958). H. J.
Heinz Co. v. NLRB, supra, is particularly strong evidence for a common policy,
since it makes reference to legislative history:
CASE COMMENTS
Inc.40 indicates that the same principles apply under either Act in
determining when the right of self-help is available.4 1 The rule permit-
ting resort to self-help if a deadlock is reached after exhausting the pro-
cedures established by the Railway Labor Act "does not appear to differ
from the rule under the National Labor Relations Act . . . that in
labor disputes classified as economic, resort to 'self-help' is permissible
when the parties' good faith bargaining reaches an impasse." 
42
Numerous cases under the NLRA uphold the employer's right to
resort to economic weapons-self-help-when bargaining has reached
an impasse or resulted in a strike.43 The language used in NLRB v.
Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co.44 is particularly significant. The case
involved the subcontracting of part of an employer's work in order
to keep his struck business operating. Since the company did not con-
sult with the union about the decision to subcontract, the National
Labor Relations Board held the company guilty of a refusal to bargain
in violation of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA.4 The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit set aside the Board's order, stating in part:
[W]e have a case where the union has turned its back on col-
lective bargaining and has, by calling a strike, placed the employer
suddenly in a position made precarious by the inexorable demands
of newspaper publishing. If publication may be interrupted while
bargaining drags on over matters which have to do with what
means the publisher may use in getting his paper on the streets
The House Committee recommended the legislation [NLRA] as "an am-
plification and clarification of the principles enacted into law by the Railway
Labor Act and by § 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act." (Emphasis
added.)
H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
40208 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 945 (1963).
41"[T]he precedents under the NLRA suggest solutions under the Railway
Labor Act. The unfortunate impasse situation is the same, regardless of the statute
involved." Id. at 193.
421d. at 191.
43E.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965) (temporary
layoff of employees as means to bring economic pressure to bear in support of em-
ployer's bargaining position); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (lockout by
members of employer association and hiring of replacements in response to whipsaw
strike against one of its members); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (hiring of permanent replacements for striking employees); Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950) (offering replacements dif-
ferent rate of pay than offered to union); Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676
(1947) (unilaterally establishing conditions of employment for replacements).
44331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964).
45As amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
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and in the mail, the paper may cease to exist. It would be a star-
tling doctrine indeed if this court 'were to tell companies and em-
ployers faced with extinction because of a strike, that before they
can make economic business decisions to contract out work in
order to continue operations, they must first consult the union
that caused the threat of extinction.4"
There are some NLRA cases which might appear to deny the right
of employers to resort to unilateral action in attempting to operate
during a strike but most can be distinguished from the situation in
Railway Clerks.47 Two of these apparently contrary cases actually
recognize the possibility that temporary, strike-induced measures may
be lawful. NLRB v. Katz48 is distinguishable in that it did not involve
a strike situation. Significantly, while holding that a unilateral change
in conditions of employment under negotiation rendered an employer
guilty of a refusal to bargain,49 the Supreme Court nevertheless noted
"the possibility that there might be circumstances which the Board
could or should accept as excusing for justifying unilateral ac-
46NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co, 331 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir. 1964).
(Emphasis added.) Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1963),
involved a strikingly similar situation with the same results:
We think that when an employer is confronted with a strike, his legal po-
sition is, in some respects, different from that which exists when no strike is
expected or occurs....
We think that a requirement that, upon the occurrence of a strike, and
before putting into effect a subcontracting arrangement designed to keep the
struck business operating, the employer must offer to bargain about the de-
cision to subcontract, would effectively deprive the employer of this method
of meeting the strike. A mere naked offer to bargain would not end the
matter. The union could, by accepting the offer, deprive the employer of an
effective means of meeting the strike for a period of time that might render
it valueless to the struck employer.
47Examples of the types of cases which can be distinguished are NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), and NLRB v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F.2d
393 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). The former involved a strike situa-
tion, but the changes instituted in response to the strike were permanent; the
latter did not involve strike-induced changes. Two cases are not clearly dis-
tinguishable. In Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615
(3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964), the union went out on strike
after the contract expired, and it was held permissible for the company to dis-
continue the union shop and checkoff, id. at 619, but not permissible to abrogate
preferential seniority rights or to alter the grievance procedure, id. at 620. In Mis-
sion Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 275 (1960), the company did not violate the NLRA by
instituting changes previously discussed with the union, even though the union
had rejected them, id. at 288, but did violate the Act by excluding the union
from the grievance procedure as a temporary, strike-induced measure because
that matter was not discussed with the union, id. at 289.
48369 US. 736 (1962).
49ld. at 747.
CASE COMMENTS
tion.... ." rO A refusal to bargain was also found in NLRB v. Tom
Joyce Floors, Inc.,5 1 where the employer paid replacements higher
wages than offered to the union. However, one of the grounds of
decision was that the company failed to introduce any evidence show-
ing that the higher rate of pay "was instituted as a temporary mea-
sure in response to an emergency situation created by the strike," 52
thus implying that such evidence might have been a defense to the
unfair labor practice charge.
The decision in Railway Clerks is important and of a salutory effect
in that for the first time the Supreme Court has held that a carrier
may make without going through the normal procedures of the Rail-
way Labor Act temporary, strike-induced deviations from existing
collective bargaining agreements if such deviations are reasonably
necessary for the carrier to continue operations. It is only reasonable
that such deviations be permitted. If carriers were required to negoti-
ate with unions concerning measures to counteract strikes, they would
in fact be precluded from exercising their right to attempt to operate.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a carrier to operate under
pre-strike conditions during such negotiation using a reduced labor
force of supervisors and untrained, unskilled replacements. 53
For these same reasons, a carrier also should be allowed to operate
with deviations from existing collective bargaining agreements while
awaiting District Court approval of the deviations. However, the
Court did not draw this logical conclusion in Railway Clerks. The
procedure of application to a district court is not provided for by the
Act. No authority is cited for it at any level of the litigation in either
Florida East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,54 or Railway
Clerks.z l
Granted that the power of a carrier to depart from an existing
labor contract should be limited to reasonably necessary measures, it
does not follow necessarily that a struck carrier should have to be-
come a supplicant before a district court in order to institute any
changes. It would appear to be more consonant with the purposes of
the Act to allow a carrier to make any changes it finds necessary in
5Old. at 748 (dictum).
51353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965).
521d. at 772.
53Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry., 384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966);
accord, NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.
1964); Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1963).
54336 F.2d 172, 182 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
55384 U.S. at 246-48, affirming Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 348
F.2d 682, 685-86 (5th Cir. 1965), affirming 57 L.R.R.M. 2618, 2622 (M.D. Fla. 1964).
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